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Abstract 
The outcome of the recent referendum in the UK was straightforwardly affected by 
the policies followed by the EU. The main factors in which eurosceptics-populists had 
used in order to collect votes were both the immigration crisis (and the consequent EU 
policies) and the European political reactions to the economic crisis which increases 
EU powers, under the German supervision, and decreases national sovereignty. 
Although these two factors may seem different, they are directly linked as long as 
they comprise an outcome of the social and democratic deficit of the EU which 
increased concerns about the future effects in the UK and offered the opportunity for 
the cultivation of populist ideas. This article aims at indicating the main parameters of 
the European social and democratic deficit which affected Britons’ decision in the 
referendum while drawing the attention on the restructure of the European policy 
directions.  
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Austerity as a crucial factor 
The outcome of the referendum in Great Britain brought once again to the surface of 
the international political debate some key issues for the very existence of the 
European Union (EU). Moreover, it has significantly highlighted the crucial political 
and economic insecurities of the European integration process. Undoubtedly, Brexit 
means that the EU is actually losing not only one of the largest and economically 
robust member,which comprise 12.8% of the total EU population and 12.57% of the 
net payments to the EU budget (HM Treasury, 2015), but also and most importantly, 
it loses London City which is one of the major global stock exchange and 
communication centers in the world. 
Undoubtedly, the marginal outcome of the British referendum which led to Brexit was 
a result of the growing Euroscepticismwhich was cultivated by right-wing populists in 
response to the growing refugee crisis and the rising fears against terrorism.It is also 
noteworthy that the public opinion in the United Kingdom(UK) was deluged by an 
odious campaign of famous conservative people and by the xenophobic right wing 
UKIP party.However, it is very simplistic to assume that the verdict of the British 
people in the referendum did not have any relation with austerity. Therefore, it is true 
that the lower socio-economic groups in the UKhave been primarily affected by the 
severe cuts of the welfare state which were implemented the last five years 
(Butterworth and Barton, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Since 2015 mass protests 
against the austerity measuresthat Cameron government implemented have intensified 
in Manchester and London. The demonstrations were against cuts in the health 
system, social housing and stressed extensive concerns about the future of the young 
generations.Cameron government contended that during its incumbency, the economy 
recovered and shows 2.3%growth while unemployment is held at an official 5.1% rate 
for 2015. The importance of welfare cuts implementation can be also seen in the 
recent resignation of the Labor Minister Ian Duncan Smith,as a result of 
intergovernmental differences about social issues. Specifically, cuts in benefits for 
long-term patients and disabled were planned and were entirely repealedby the 
government after the resignation of the Minister.It is also noteworthy that the 
government from the very beginning, approached austerity as a matter of upgrading 
morality in the sense that it reduces welfare dependency, restores continence and 
encourage creativity and individual initiative (Schiller, 2013).But ordinary people in 
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the UK do not necessarily associate austerityand their own social status just with 
Cameron policy but in several occasions,with the EU policy of budgetary restrictions 
from the beginning of the economic crisis. 
Cameron government actually followed Merkel policy which considers that 
development is not an opposing concept to fiscal stabilization but rather the two 
concepts are closely connected. In the same direction, the Conservative government in 
the UK thought that the British economy could achieve an “expansionary fiscal 
contraction”, meaning that cutting public spending may increase private spending.As 
Finance Minister Osborne (2010)noted,“modern economics understand the 
importance of expectations and confidence. Businesses and individuals have turned 
their gaze to the future and while there are not absolutely rational creatures,as the 
Ricardian equivalence theory assumed, uncertainty about future paths of tax rates and 
government spending strongly influences their behavior. This is especially true when 
it comes to consumer spending and business investment ... a credible fiscal 
consolidation plan will certainly have a positive impact due to greater certainty and 
confidence for the future”. This view is supported by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which also considers that if public deficits are not reduced, development is 
impossible to be encouraged because deficits increase the concerns of investors about 
the debt and thus intensify the tendency for savings by reducing consumption and 
concomitantly, unemployment increasesand productivityreduces (Ostry, Ghosh and 
Espinoza, 2015). Therefore, deficit reduction is based on this key concept for its 
relation with development (Miller, 2010).Thus, it is not surprising that the British Left 
was divided before the referendum with one part only to be opposed to Brexit 
particularly because of the xenophobic hysteria expressed by the right-wing 
campaign. However, the other part of the British Left advocated Brexit as long as it 
considered the EU as a quintessential of social injustice even by presenting the 
example of Greece where EU leaders, from the beginning of the crisis, simply ignored 
public verdict and imposed harsh austerity measures. For this reason Jeremy Corbyn, 
the Labour Party leader, was accused for being half-committed to the Remain 
campaign (The Economist, 2016).  
Surely, it would have been wrong to confine austerity as the dominant factorwhich 
forged the decision in favor of Brexit and definitely “those who voted for ‘leave’ did 
it for many and partly contradictory reasons,from concerns about migration and as a 
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reaction to ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ because of massive disinformation of the British 
media to concerns about their benefits protectionand (many others in South and South 
East England) in order to promote a more entrepreneurial Britain with global 
reference” (Lavdas, 2016).Besides, it is noteworthy that Britons have already 
expressed their concerns about immigration by noting that immigrants are receiving 
more benefits from the welfare system than they contribute (Dustmann, Frattini, Hall, 
2010). Politicians who supported Brexit were aware ofsuch mainstream opinions of 
the British society, and tried – successfully – to exploit the immigration crisis even 
more in order to construct the argument that through Brexit a controlled immigration 
policy will be achieved (see, for instance, Frank Field’s article on the 
Guardian,14/06/2016).  
Although it seems that immigration crisis conduced extensively to the final decision, 
it turns out though,that austerity contributed to a marginal but crucial manner, 
whichfinally tilted the balance in favor of Brexit especially, inasmuch as the 
restrictive policies that Germany promotes were used by the political forces that 
express the British populism in order to collect votes in favor of Brexit. In other 
words, in the UK the actual effects of austerity were not so influential as the rhetoric 
and propaganda used by the populist forces.In any case, Brexit can beconsidered, 
particularly from the southern countries (France, Italy, Greece, Portugal), as a great 
opportunity to create a front against the austerity policies that led the EU to the 
stalemate of Brexit and to change direction and foster development, democracy and 
social policy, as a way to rescue the European project.It is clear that the same 
direction is also followed by the European social democracy, with the president of the 
German SPD, Vice-Chancellor and German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel to 
point out that “if we want to save Europe we should return to an agenda with 
emphasis on democracy, development and social justice” and to arguethat Brexit can 
become “an opportunity for the restart of Europe”, stressing out that it is expected a 
debate on austerity to be opened and “Germany must do more about it ... within the 
federal government we should discuss again how we can improve the life of people in 
Europe, this is the only way to reduce Euroscepticism”(Imerisia.gr, 2016). 
Beyond the far-right xenophobic propaganda which was essentially relied on fear and 
partly on the promotion of enemy figurines, the result of the referendum in the UK 
reveals that the European institutions have lost their real meaning, as a result of the 
 5 
 
undemocratic procedures followed by the EU leadership which ignore the social 
needs and follow faithfully the interests of multinational companies and banks. 
Exactly this fact was the main factor which led a large part of the electoral base of the 
Labour Party not to follow the official line of the leadership and consequently, voted 
for Brexit.Surely, austerity was not the dominant reason for the result of the 
referendum, considering that even the conservative successor of Cameron is unlikely 
to change the economic policydirection. Nevertheless, the legacy of austerity that 
Cameron government carries and the hegemonic German policy of imposing austerity 
across Europe, boosted potential refusal trends towards European integration. 
Unfortunately, the first victims of the referendum would not be others than the 
socially vulnerable andthe socio-economically lower migrant groups. Populists, 
especially of the right, are definitely pushing towards more disintegration as they 
believe that the achieved European integration created a significant social and 
economic divergence (Liddle, 2016). The explicit example of this opinion is the 
achievement of populists in the UK, who have used immigration and socio-economic 
divergence as the main factors towards voting for Brexit. Thus, it is not surprising that 
in regions with low or stagnant income growth the majority was anti-EU (Financial 
Times, 2016). 
      
Preliminary effects  
Already, however, the tones generated by the EU against the UK are intensified and 
declare a clear denial against special privileges as regards access to the internal 
market. Also,the impact from Brexit on the EU is not insignificant. For instance, the 
coverage of the consequent financing gap for the EU budgets will sufficiently charge 
Germany, France and Italy, which are major contributors.Furthermore, according to 
IMF projections, several economic shocks or a synchronized slowdown are 
possible,which are expected to create significant negative effects on the international 
economic cycleand should be addressed through “well-coordinated oversight and 
global financial safety nets”(International Monetary Fund, 2016:207). With the 
weakening of the British economy, further negative economic effects are expected for 
the countries which are stillfacing the consequences of the financial crisis and have 
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close trade connections with Britain, such as the Netherlands, Ireland and Cyprus 
(Global Counsel, 2015).  
The exit of the UK from the EU is a crucial part on the European integration history, 
which,up until the UK referendum, had only inputs. The biggest risk is political than 
economical and is related with the strengthen of there-nationalization trends in Europe 
by the increasing anti-European populism of Marie Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Nigel 
Farage (Klein, 2016).However, there are detailed analyses (Schult, 2016) which 
conclude that Brexit will have disastrous consequences for the UK but great 
advantages for the EU. According to such opinions the positive consequences could 
be: 
Firstly, Brexit may become a deterrent for any imitators. Even if right-wing populists 
such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France,achieve the 
conduction of such a referendum in their countries, citizens are expected to vote 
forremainingin the EU as long as the negative news for the UK economy increase 
their fears. The first negative consequences includethe fall of the British pound and 
the downfall of the UK by rating agencies. Specifically, the change from stable to 
negative of the outlook for the creditworthiness of the UK by Moody’s (Moody’s, 
2016), the decline of Britain’s long-term credit rating from “AAA” to “AA” by 
Standard&Poor’s, putting also a negative outlook (BBC, 2016) and the downgrading 
of the UK Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings to "AA" 
from "AA +" by Fitch Ratings with a negative outlook in the wake of the referendum 
(FitchRatings, 2016a), presage severe turmoil for the British economy. Furthermore, 
Fitch has downgraded from "AA +" to "AA" the evaluation of the Bank of England 
(BoE), with a negative outlook(FitchRatings, 2016b). 
The deterrent effect is naturally associated with a harsh EU negotiating 
strategyagainst the UK which, as already stated by the German Chancellor Merkel 
(SüddeutscheZeitung, 2016), will not allow any selectivity in the sense that a clear 
difference must exist between an EU member state and a country that is no longer a 
member. Merkel (SüddeutscheZeitung, 2016) also pointed out that the negotiations 
with the UK should not be conducted according to the principle of selectivity and that 
no country should expect that, after the exit of Britain from the EU, the obligations 
can be deletedbut the privileges still remain, by mentioning as an example the access 
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to the EU internal market. According to this opinion, anyone who wishes to access, 
should accept the four fundamental EU freedoms, namely the free movement of 
people, goods, services and capital. 
The second positive consequence of Brexit is that the British would no longer block 
the European integration process in areas such as the economicgovernance in a way 
that national decisions will not endanger the common market. This requires common 
economic governance. Similarly, in the field of foreign and security policy the 
increasing needs for military operations require the establishment of permanent 
common governance which all member states have accepted in the past except from 
the UK. Foreign policy needs additional simple majority in order to make decisions. 
Moreover, the refugee crisis stressed the need for the establishment of a common 
European border police, a common legal framework for asylum and a fair distribution 
of refugees. 
 
The European social and democratic deficit  
Beyond late and obviously immature estimation, Brexit certainly comprise an alarm 
for conscious Europeans in order to stand united and continue the path to the 
European integration. In any case, the British verdict shows that various objections 
exist about European integration. Certainly, in Britain refugee crisis was a crucial 
parameter which affected the electorate as long as lower income groups feared not to 
lose their jobs by the cheaper foreign labor force coming from Europe’s internal 
market and the European obligation to accept refugees has increased this tension.  
Clearly, fear generally lacks a rational basis. However, the current European 
leadership did nothing to reduce the factors which influence people to fear the 
European integration and refugees. The setting which feeds negativity against Europe 
is actually socio-political and is related with the broader social insecurity and 
precariousness (Standing, 2014; Wilson and Hadler, 2016) which havebeen increased 
amid crisis in Europe along with the democratic deficit(Bellamy andKröger, 2012; 
Crum, 2013; Habermas, 2012). Britons voted against the ruling character of the 
European Commission which can impose to the UK rules, norms and sanctions which 
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are not subject to the judgment of British voters. Brexit campaign systematically 
raised the necessity of regaining sovereignty and the populist right-wing politician 
Boris Johnson presented himself as a top fighter for Britain’s liberation under the 
slogan “We will take back control” (Giegold, 2016). 
Certainly,Britons never lost control of their sovereignty but they feel that they do not 
clearly know the ways important decisions concerning their country are made. 
Currently, the major European problem is the lack of transparency and immature 
democracy (Giegold, 2016). A typical example is that while Britain is one of the 
strongest countries in the most powerful Europeaninstitution, namely the European 
Council, Britons seem to be unaware of their governmental positions andtheir 
influence on specific decisions, as long as European Council holds closed meetings 
without protocol and required approval and consequently, without public exposure 
through the European parliament (Giegold, 2016). 
A second example is that the European Parliament is not included in decisions on 
major issues and also does not seem have a completeinitiative capability. Therefore,it 
cannot submit its own drafts of lawin order to be voted through a legislative process. 
It is obvious that populist politicians such as the UKIP leader Nigel Farage, in a 
country with an extensive parliamentary tradition, encounter no difficulties to exploit 
the European democratic deficitsand cultivate a vision that the UK flexibility in 
implementing national policies is constantly been controlled by Brussels. 
 
The German sovereigntyissue 
Admittedly, a crucial issue which bothers not only Britons but also most European 
citizens is that the balance of power within the European institutions, particularly 
those related to financial stability and economic policy at the EU and Eurozone level 
are actually controlled by Germany (Beck, 2013). The Federal Republic of Germany 
as “primary creditor” controls the Eurogroup, the Euro Working Group, the European 
Council, the Councils of Ministers, strongly influences the European Commission and 
has a special relationship with the IMF and the ECB. To this end, Wolfgang Schäuble 
as the representative of the German economic policy, has a leading role within the 
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European institutions which make decisions (Mavrozacharakis and Tzagkarakis, 
2015). 
France, Italy and some other countries unsuccessfully try in several cases to 
counteract and mitigate the German influence, as shown in the Greek issue. This 
framework works tightly on the negotiating ability of any country that inconsistently 
attempts to reverse the situation, conclude, amend the rules or change the terms of an 
agreement. The current Greek government has extensivelyencountered this 
suffocating experience and decided to conduct a referendum as an attempt to open the 
negotiating field. However, the effectiveness of the referendum was reducedby the 
emitted messages mainly from Germany. In this case Schäuble–whose statements are 
usually reliable compass orientation for European institutions – had unequivocally 
expressed that the negotiations after the referendum, independently from its result, 
will start from the beginning and will include tougher conditions (Mavrozacharakis 
and Tzagkarakis, 2015).Similarly, after Brexit, the UK is threatened with tough 
negotiating conditions. 
Under suffocating German leadership conditions,the central European financial 
governance process was promoted at the time that David Cameron, the former Prime 
Minister of the UK, insisted on increasing thesovereignty of the EU member states 
through enlargement of the powers of national parliaments. Partly by completely 
ignoring the British complaints, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande and Matteo Renzi 
along with the other European leaders, tried to create the next steps towards a 
European central state, by introducing a form of a European economic governance, a 
European social policy and a European protective policy of deposits and funds. The 
purpose of thisproject was to unite the German obsession for monetary stability with 
the French intention for increase of theinvestments.Obviously, Germany remains the 
main actor of this process, which after 2010 imposed the austerity dogma in the 
Eurozone (Beck, 2013; Patomäki, 2013)while failed to cover its institutional deficit. 
Currently, Germany attemptsretrospectively to cope with this problem in order to 
increase competitiveness in the Euro area through the transfer of even more power 
from national states to the European Commission (Mavrozacharakis, 2016). 
By strengthening the Eurogroup, which is an adjacent institution outside the 
democratic process as it is not directly elected by the European citizens,significant 
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questions aboutlegitimacyare being raised, related both with the formal functioning of 
the institutions and the role of extra-institutional interventions. It is actually confirmed 
that this is an attempt to cover the inadequate institutional effectiveness of the 
Eurozone through institutions and arrangements that have limited legitimacy, as they 
are mainly technocratic and democratically elected (Habermas, 2012), and lead to the 
creation of an informal and shadow government under the leadership of Germany 
(Mavrozacharakis and Tzagkarakis, 2015; Mavrozacharakis, 2016). 
Currently, the abovementioned form of governance includes Angela Merkel, Francois 
Hollande, the IMF, the ECB, the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, the president of ESM Klaus Reglingand is often complemented by other 
heads of state, technocratic institutions and institutional representatives. Atypical 
intergovernmental institutions of this type often substitute the formal European 
institutional structures in crisis management. The recent Greek example comprises a 
tangible proof.When the Greek government demanded political resolution around the 
Greek rescue plan, it essentially legalized the informal council of Merkel, Hollande, 
Lagarde, Draghi and Juncker in cooperation with the Brussels Group, to function as a 
governmental intermediary channel. Consequently, this procedure led to the 
preparation of aninstitutionally unregulated proposal, incredibly anti-social, which 
exceeded even the narrow framework which was followed by the Troika. To a certain 
extent, this example is indicative of the governmental framework related with 
Eurozone’s future that Germany intends to create. Beyond the informal directorate 
which is actually in operation, measures such as the creation of an independent fiscal 
authority within the Eurozone that will collect taxes independently from national 
governments, is being discussed (Patomäki, 2013). The abovementioned political 
framework lead to an unsuccessful and socio-politically weak policy for the European 
future, designed by Germany.It should not be underestimated that SYRIZA has won 
the elections in Greece as a consequence of increased social anger against economic 
reforms promoted by the insistence of Germany which were concentrated to austerity. 
The German reform of the European policy finds no majorities in European 
populations but rather tends to strengthen radicalism and national populism(Chopin, 
2015). 
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The common market area is exposed to the risk of a circular and permanent austerity 
and Germany tries to avoid this danger only with imperfect bureaucratic solutions and 
only by the implementation of the quantitative easing policy by the ECB, it is 
impossible to maintain a relatively satisfactory level of liquidity. Fiscal policies the 
austerity paradigm and public investment are necessary (De Grauwe, 2015). 
Therefore, in the question whether Germany is blameless about the situation that 
prevailed in the UK, the response is negative because “the feeling of a German-
Europe (combined with the blatant misinformed portion of the British Media) had a 
significant impact on the elderly voters, in particular in England and Wales ...” and 
“the intensity with which certain .... who supported Brexit defended their choice with 
reference to the Berlin power” is frightening (Lavdas, 2016). 
 
Tentative Concluding Remarks 
Social and democratic deficits in the EU institutions and the sense of a German-
Europe can be considered as two of the main factors which increase populism across 
Europe. Therefore, the most important conclusion about the result of the British 
referendum is that there is a strong necessity of returning to the vision of a social 
Europe and the democratic reform of the European institutions. Thereby, 
strengthening the European integration would be based on social and democratic 
legitimacy. Brexit may therefore become an opportunity for Europe to overtake some 
of its serious structural, institutional and democratic weaknessesin order to 
reduceeuro-skepticism and the tendency for re-nationalizationof Europe. But this 
confrontation can hardly be realized if the European vision does not regain its social 
and democratic dimensions. 
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